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Abstract:  
Are shared democratic values the most important factors in promoting peace between countries, 
or common economic interests? New econometric research shows that, in the case of India and 
Pakistan, trade with other countries increases the chance of peace.  
J.E.L Codes: F15, F51, F52 
 
Key Words: Inter-state conflict and trade, democracy and conflict, conflict and economic 
development. 
 
                                                 
∀
 Visit http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/articles/trading_for_peace 
Φ
 Dawood Mamoon is a Netherlands Fellowship holder at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, where he is 
reading for a PhD on trade, poverty, inequality and security. He is also a visiting research associate and consultant at the 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan. He has written extensively on the political economy of India and Pakistan in 
various South Asian and international publications.  
Γ
 Syed Mansoob Murshed is professor of the economics of conflict and peace at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, the 
Netherlands, and professor of international economics at the Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK. He is 
the author of five books and 80 book chapters and journal articles. His research interests include the economics of conflict, aid 
conditionality, political economy, macroeconomics and international economics.  
 
1. Introduction:  
What factors are most important in promoting peaceful relations between countries – the 
values they share, or their common economic interests? One way to define the sharing of 
norms and values is when countries have common political systems, as is the case with 
democracies. As long ago as 1795, the philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that nation 
states based on ‘republican’ constitutions will not go to war with each other, but will 
instead be in a state of ‘perpetual peace’.1 Put another way, democracies will not fight 
each other because they share cultural norms that preclude the use of force as a means of 
dispute resolution, or because the checks and balances that characterize political 
processes in advanced democracies restrain violence. This idea is described as 
democratic peace.  
An alternative hypothesis is liberal peace, which suggests that democratic states 
cooperate not because of their similar political systems, but because of their mutual 
economic interests. International trade is central to this idea. For more than two centuries 
scholars have stressed the fact that when nations are engaged in commerce they will also 
be at peace.2  
In our research, we have examined these two ideas in the case of India and Pakistan, two 
nations that are well known for their mutual hostility despite their shared historical 
heritage.  
2. Armed peace 
Outright war is just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations, but armed peace is 
equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan have fought at least four wars 
(in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999), but have otherwise spent a great deal of time engaged in 
uncompromising posturing vis-à-vis each other. India, for example, has frequently 
accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism on her territory. But occasionally the two 
nations make goodwill gestures, such as agreeing to resume the bus service between the 
cities of Delhi and Lahore, and organizing cricket tours.3 Less frequently, they appear 
willing to make concessions; in 2003, for example, President Pervez Musharraf 
announced that he was ready to put aside Pakistan’s long-standing demand, supported by 
United Nations resolutions, for a plebiscite to settle the future of Kashmir.4  
Our research has demonstrated that in both countries military expenditures are 
considerable5 – in India about 3% of its gross domestic product (GDP) and in Pakistan 
about 5% of GDP. One can assume that such large military expenditures have a negative 
impact on efforts to promote development and reduce poverty in the two countries.6  
Do the tense relations between the two states result from a lack of common democratic 
values, or from a lack of economic ties? On the first point, we first consulted the analyses 
of the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management,7 which score 
countries in terms of their level of democracy or authority. India has long had one of the 
highest democracy scores in the developing world (7–9 out of a maximum of 10). 
Pakistan’s experience with democracy has been volatile, with both high authority scores 
(–7) associated with the military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999, and high 
democracy scores of 8. Although the current regime in Pakistan has a military 
orientation, and is therefore less democratic, it has nevertheless made major concessions 
to India in the long-standing dispute over Kashmir. Could that softer stance be related to 
Pakistan’s economic growth record in recent years?  
Caption: Border guards at Wagah, on the India–Pakistan border : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, Pakistan’s economic growth rates have been impressive, although somewhat 
slower than India’s. When countries move to higher levels of economic development the 
opportunity costs of conflict could increase as they have more to lose, and have more 
resources with which to negotiate peaceful settlements.  
Official trade between India and Pakistan (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total international 
trade) declined steadily from nearly 20% in the years following partition in 1947, 
plummeting to almost zero after the war in 1965. Although there were some signs of 
recovery in the 1990s, trade is still below the levels of the 1950s. This is despite the fact 
that both India and Pakistan now have fairly open economies.  
 
3. Chain of causation  
Our research has found that military expenditures tend to move inversely with 
development spending (particularly on education), providing prima facie evidence that 
high military expenditures can crowd out spending in the social sectors.  
Our work was based on a time series econometric model, and an evolutionary analysis of 
the India–Pakistan conflict from 1950 to 2005. Using data on economic growth, 
economic integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade, military expenditures and 
democracy, we examined how these variables may have contributed to the increase or 
decrease in hostilities between the two nations. We also used various tests to investigate 
the chain of causation between each of these variables and conflict – in other words, do 
these variables promote conflict, or, conversely, does conflict also contribute to their 
evolution (reverse causality)?  
Our most significant result is that multilateral trade, or increased international trade with 
the rest of the world (in contrast to bilateral trade between India and Pakistan), is the 
most significant factor in reducing conflict. Our analysis also showed that while 
hostilities in the Kashmir dispute have hampered bilateral trade between the two nations, 
the converse is also true. Increased trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict, 
and any measures to improve the bilateral trade are likely to have considerable benefits in 
terms of confidence building.  
In the short term, improving Indian access to Pakistani markets will help decrease 
hostilities between the two countries; whereas in the long run, as peace is achieved, both 
countries could export more to each other. A regional trade agreement along the lines of 
the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) could also help to improve relations 
between India and Pakistan in the long term. Their degree of openness to world trade is, 
however, the dominant economic factor in conflict resolution. Thus, as both countries 
become more closely integrated into the global economy, the hostilities between them are 
more likely to diminish.  
We also find that Pakistan’s military expenditures are more sensitive to hostilities with its 
neighbour, whereas India’s military activities are not entirely focused on Pakistan. India, 
the regional hegemon, has other domestic and international concerns to which its defence 
spending is targeted, beyond its dispute with Pakistan. Overall, India may have shown 
more belligerence towards its neighbours because of its greater military power. For 
example, India unilaterally massed troops on Pakistan’s borders in 1951 and 2002. 
Indeed, there is some reverse causality between military capability and conflict, meaning 
that they both cause each other. This suggests that Pakistan’s military build-ups may have 
been more in response to India’s actions.  
Overall, in both countries, high military expenditures are diverting scarce resources away 
from social development, such as education, and poverty reduction. Education spending 
was found to be good for both peace and economic progress in our study.  
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4. A liberal peace 
In an ideal world, democracy between pairs of nations should reduce inter-state hostility, 
according to the democratic peace hypothesis. In the case of India and Pakistan this 
relationship is present but weak. Peace initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the 
sole prerogative of democracies; they can also be made by countries that are less than 
perfectly democratic out of economic self-interest. Pakistan, for example, has offered 
unilateral concessions on many disputed issues with India.  
The findings of our analysis, however, lean towards the alternative liberal peace 
hypothesis. Economic progress, combined with greater openness to international trade in 
general are more significant drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, 
than are the independent contributions of a common democratic polity. So economic 
interdependence rather than politics is more likely to contribute to peaceful relations 
between India and Pakistan in the future.  
In many ways, our findings echo those of Solomon Polachek, who argued that 
democracies cooperate not because they have common political systems, but because 
their economies are intricately interdependent.8 As pointed by Håvard Hegre,9 it is at 
these higher stages of economic development that common democratic values can make 
significant contributions to peace. Meaningful democracy can not truly function in 
countries where poverty is acute and endemic, even in ostensible democracies such as 
India.  
In the final analysis, as suggested nearly half a century ago by Seymour Lipset, it may be 
that democracy itself is a by-product of increased general prosperity.10 Then, and only 
then, will nations be able to fully appreciate the futility of inter-state conflict.11  
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